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THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a conflict between the text of the Lanham Act and how courts
interpret the Lanham Act. The Lanham Act states that once the plaintiff proves
infringement, "the plaintiff shall be entitled, ... subject to the principles of equity,
to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and
(3) the costs of the action."' Several courts, however, interpret the phrase
"subject to the principles of equity" as imposing two requirements before the
plaintiff can recover monetary relief: the plaintiff must prove actual confusion
(i.e., that people were actually confused by defendant's use of the plaintiff's mark),
and/or willfulness (i.e., that defendant's infringement was willful). While the
courts are split on this issue, many courts impose either one or both of these
requirements. The result is that if a case does not fit neatly into the boundaries
of either requirement, the plaintiff is denied monetary relief without a full
consideration of the equities.
This Article is not alone in arguing that many courts have misinterpreted the
Lanham Act by creating the requirements of actual confusion and willfulness.
The courts themselves are split on this question, with several circuits arguing
against any such requirements.2 While there is little academic commentary on this
issue, several commentators argue against such requirements.3 The Supreme
Court has been asked to step in,4 but it denied a petition for certiorari that would
have squarely addressed the circuit split.'
The purpose of this Article is not to rehash the arguments that it is error to
impose requirements of actual confusion or willfulness before a court awards
monetary relief. These arguments are surely correct and are supported by the
statute and sound policy. The problem with these arguments, however, is that
stating that we should abolish these requirements begs the question-if there
were no specific requirements for awarding monetary relief, in what circumstances
should courts award monetary relief? This Article seeks to fill that void, and thus
'15 U.S.C. 5 1117(a) (2000).
2 See infra notes 36-37, 57 and accompanying text.
Seegeneral#, e.g., Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark Infingement: The Role ofBad Faith
in Awarding an Acounting of Defendant's Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863 (2002); Keith M. Stolte,
RemedyingJudicial Limitations on Trademark Remedies: An Accounting of Profits Should Not Require a Fining
of Bad Faith, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 271 (1997) [hereinafter An Accounting of Profits]; Keith M. Stolte,
Remedying Judicial lamitations on Trademark Remedies: Monetary Relef Shoul Not Require Proof of Actual
Confusion, 75 DENY. U. L. REV. 229 (1997) [hereinafter Monetagy Rekejl.
4 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Contessa Premium Foods, Inc. v. Berdex Seafood, Inc., 126
S. Ct. 472 (2005) (No. 04-1693).
5 Contessa Premium Foods, Inc. v. Berdex Seafood, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 472 (2005).
2007]
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advance the arguments for abolition of the current model, by proposing a new
model called the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model.
The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model states that the plaintiff must prove (1)
infringement plus (2) some equitable reason why it is entided to monetary relief.
Like the Lanham Act's "subject to the principles of equity," the Infringement-
Plus-Equity Model leaves "some equitable reason" undefined and broad because
the problem with the current model is that any requirement-actual confusion,
willfulness, or anything else-is too confining. Instead, the Infringement-Plus-
Equity Model realizes that there are an infinite variety of circumstances that,
based on the equities, may warrant monetary relief. As a result, the Infringement-
Plus-Equity Model comprises an extensive, open-ended list of factors that courts
can consider when deciding whether to award monetary relief.6 Under the
Infringement-Plus-Equity Model, courts can still use actual confusion and
willfulness as sufficient equitable reasons to award monetary relief. These
doctrines have, after all, developed over the centuries for valid reasons, and they
are important. They just should not be the only two available. The Infringement-
Plus-Equity Model thus advances equity by permitting the plaintiff to argue any
equitable reasons that fit the plaintiff's circumstance.
This Article argues in favor of the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model with six
Parts. Part II describes the monetary relief provision of the Lanham Act. Part
III describes how many courts have bypassed the text of this provision by
imposing the requirements of actual confusion and/or willfulness before a
pla-itff is eligible for monetary relief. Part IV argues that imposing any
requirement before a plaintiff is eligible for monetary relief is problematic for
three reasons: (1) neither the history of the Lanham Act nor the history of
trademark caselaw supports any such requirements; (2) the rationales courts
advance in favor of the current model fail, upon closer scrutiny, to justify
requirements of actual confusion or willfulness; and (3) the current model has
caused jurisprudential problems as courts try to temper its harshness. Part V
advances the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model, explaining how it solves the
problems of the current model while being more fair to litigants. This Part also
includes three examples to explain how the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model will
work in practice. Part VI concludes that courts should replace the current model
with the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model.
6 See infra Part V.A (describing the different factors that courts can use when deciding whether
to award monetary relief).
[Vol. 14:205
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II. THE MONETARY RELIEF PROVISION OF THE LANHAM ACT
The text of the Lanham Act creates a two-step process for awarding monetary
relief in cases of trademark infringement and violations under Section 43(a).7
First, the plaintiff must prove infringement.' This is generally accomplished by
satisfying a mulifactor test that determines whether there is a "likelihood of
confusion" between the plaintiff's mark and the defendant's allegedly infringing
mark.9 Each circuit has its own multifactor test, although there is substantial
overlap between them.' ° This multifactor test applies to many forms of
trademark infringement, including common-law trademark infringement,"
infringement of a federally registered trademark, 2 and violations under § 43(a)."
Second, and after the plaintiff proves infringement by satisfying the applicable
circuit's likelihood-of-confusion test, the Lanham Act permits the plaintiff to
recover both injunctive and monetary relief. 4 But neither form of relief is
automatic upon proof of infringement. Instead, both injunctive and monetary
relief are available "subject to the principles of equity."'" In other words, the
plaintiff must satisfy both the likelihood-of-confusion test and the principles of
equity to qualify for monetary or injunctive relief. The Lanham Act grants courts
the power to award monetary relief in § 1117(a), which reads in full:
7 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
8 Id.
9 4J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1
(4th ed. 2006).
10 See, e.g., Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (establishing a
seven-factor test); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341,348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (establishing
an eight-factor test); In m E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973)
(establishing a thirteen-factor test); seegeneral4 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Mutifactor Tests
for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1581 (2006) (describing Professor's Beebe's empirical
results regarding each circuit's likelihood-of-confusion test).
n 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:1.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000).
13 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); U-Haul Int'l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1042 (9th Cir.
1986) (holding that the remedies available under § 1117(a) apply to unfair competition claims as well
as trademark infringement claims under § 1125(a)); see also New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595
F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[U]nder the Lanham Act [Section 43(a)] the ultimate test is
whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks. Whether we
call the violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of origin, the test is
identical-is there a 'likelihood of confusion?' " (citations omitted)).
14 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
15 Id; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (2000) (giving courts the power to grant injunctions "according
to the principles of equity"); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 30:89 (4th ed. 2006) ("TIThe federal courts have held that § 35 of the Lanham Act
does not mean that a successful plaintiff is entitled in all cases to a monetary award in addition to
injunctive relief.').
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When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered
in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section
1125(a), (c), or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under section
1125(c) of this title, shall have been established in any civil action
arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to
the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to
the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.
The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same
to be assessed under its direction. In assessing profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must
prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In assessing
damages the court may enter judgment, according to the
circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as
actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the
court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is
either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter
judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according
to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of the above
circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. The
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the
prevailing party.'
6
As 5 1117(a) makes clear, the Lanham Act establishes four types of monetary
remedies: (1) defendant's profits, (2) plaintiff's damages, (3) costs, and (4)
attorneys' fees.' 7 This Article focuses on the first two remedies because there are
separate rules and statutes that determine when and how a plaintiff can recover
its costs," and because 5 1117(a) expressly provides that recovery of attorneys'
fees are only available in "exceptional cases."' 9
Injunctions are the ordinary and presumptive remedy for trademark
infringement.2' The leading commentator on trademark law describes the reason
16 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (emphasis added).
17 Id.
18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1921 (2000) (listing costs that a U.S. Marshal may collect as fees); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920 (2000) (listing costs that may be taxed); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (listing costs other than
attorneys' fees).
"9 For a discussion about what types of cases qualify for attorneys' fees, see Lara A. Holzman
et al., What Makes a Case 'Excep ional"?: AwardingAltorney Fees in Trademark Litgation, N.Y. ST. B.A.J.,
Mar./Apr. 2006, at 34.
20 SIEGRUN D. KANE, TRADEMARK LAW: A PRACTITIONER's GUIDE § 17:1 (4th ed. 2006)
("Injunctive relief is the traditional remedy for trademark infringement, although in some cases
[Vol. 14:205
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why injunctions follow as a matter of course after a plaintiff establishes likelihood
of confusion: "If an injunction were denied, the court would be telling plaintiff
to sit by and watch defendant continue to violate the law and infringe upon
plaintiff's rights until such time as plaintiff decided to sue again for money
damages as compensation for the past injury incurred."' Thus, in a typical case
of trademark infringement, an injunction will satisfy the equities and there will be
no need for monetary recovery.
Unlike injunctions, however, monetary relief does not follow as a matter of
course after a finding of infringement.2 2 If a plaintiff is entitled to monetary relief,
the two main types of relief available are the defendant's profits and the plaintiffs
damages.' Profits and damages are two sides of the same harm: the defendant's
profits represent the ill-gotten profits of the infringer, and the plaintiffs damages
represent the injury suffered as a result of the infringement.2 4 The reasons for
both types of monetary relief are historical and practical. Historically, before the
merger of law and equity, a plaintiff could allege trademark infringement at law
for damages or at equity for an injunction.2 5 But to avoid the need for separate
actions, courts of equity often awarded monetary relief in addition to an
injunction.26 As a practical matter, the tenuous, market-based gains of trademark
infringement are difficult to establish with the requisite degree of certainty
necessary for legal damages, which makes an accounting of profits a convenient
surrogate for the damages that a plaintiff suffered.27
monetary relief will also be awarded."); see, e.g., Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d
1175, 1180 (9th Cit. 1988) (describing injunctions as the "remedy of choice").
21 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 30:2 (footnote omitted).
2 KANE, supra note 20, § 17:3 ("Monetary relief is by no means routinely awarded in trademark
infringement actions. Under the Lanham Act, monetary relief, that is, profits, damages, and costs,
will be awarded 'subject to the principles of equity.' "); see, e.g., Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group
PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cit. 2002) ("Section 1117(a) remedies are awarded 'subject to the
principles of equity.' Thus, an award of the defendant's profits is not automatic.').
215 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. a (1995) (describing damages
as "the loss suffered by the plaintiff," and an accounting of profits as "the defendant's gain rather
than the plaintiff's loss').
25 Id, § 36 cmt. b (chronicling the history of the damage remedy).
26 id
7 See infra note 51 and accompanying text; see also William G. Barber, Recovey of Profits Under the
Lanham Act: Are the District Courts Doing Their Job?, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 141, 141 n.3 (1992)
("Although a more precise measure of damages for such diverted sales would be the profit the
plaintiff would have made on those sales, for the sake of simplicity courts often award the
defendant's profits as a surrogate measure of the plaintiff's damages.'); Merchant Media, LLC v.
H.S.M. Int'l, No. 05 Civ. 2817, 2006 WL 3479022, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,2006) ("I]n the current
evidentiary vacuum, there is no basis to award plaintiffs any damages under the Lanham Act.'). But
this surrogate is more convenient than accurate, especially when the litigants do not compete and
2007]
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There is considerable confusion among the courts about the what and how of
monetary recovery-what is the difference between profits and damages and how
much money can the plaintiff recover?28 For purposes of this Article, however,
I need not delve into this confusion because I discuss the predicate, foundational
question of whether the plaintiff is entitled to any monetary recovery. That is, I
focus solely on what the plaintiff must (and should) do to recover any monetary
award, not the secondary questions of what that monetary recovery would
comprise.
III. COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THE LANHAM ACT As IMPOSING
REQUIREMENTS OF ACTUAL CONFUSION AND WILLFULNESS
The previous Part described how the Lanham Act establishes a two-step
process for awarding monetary relief: the plaintiff must first prove infringement
by satisfying its circuit's likelihood-of-confusion test, and the court must then
decide whether to award monetary relief "subject to the principles of equity.
29
Unfortunately, some courts have diverged from this process by circumscribing the
universe of "the principles of equity" to a few limited fact patterns. This Part
describes the two main court-imposed requirements: actual confusion and
willfulness.
A. THE REQUIREMENT OF ACTUAL CONFUSION
Actual confusion is a slippery concept. To begin with, what qualifies as actual
confusion, and what constitutes competent evidence of actual confusion, varies
from court to court."0 This Article, however, does not discuss these vagaries
thus there is little correlation between a sale by defendant and a sale by the plaintiff. Indeed, there
are several problems with viewing profits as a surrogate, such as different profit margins and cost
structures that make a profit-to-damage correlation imperfect. One commentator described the
problem of how, assuming the infringer enters the market with a typically downward-facing demand
curve, it is likely that the infringer will sell more than the plaintiff would, rendering the correlation
flawed. Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909,
1920 (1997).
' E.g., William L. Anthony, Jr. & Stephen N. Adams, Proving Damages in Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Cases, 717 PLI/PAT. 7, 33-34 (2002) ("[l]t is frequently difficult to maintain a clear
distinction between recovery based on the defendant's profits and that based on the plaintiff's
damages."); Michael Anthony Arciero, Trademark Infringement and Plaintiffs Damages: Lanham Act
f 35(a), 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 320, 320 (2001) (describing how courts confuse and conflate
damages and profits and how "this phraseology does not account for the difference in the policies
underlying each of these distinct remedies").
29 See supra Part II.
" For a discussion about what constitutes actual confusion, see generally Mark D. RobinsActual
[Vol. 14:205
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because it instead focuses on whether there is, and should be, any requirement of
actual confusion before a plaintiff can recover a monetary award. Therefore, this
Article uses the phrase "actual confusion" broadly to mean any type of actual
confusion that courts require before awarding monetary relief.
Another reason why actual confusion is a slippery concept is that it occurs in
two contexts in trademark litigation-one of which is appropriate and the other
is a subject of this Article. The first and appropriate context is that actual
confusion is one factor among many in each circuit's multifactor test of trademark
infringement. As described above in Part II, each circuit has its own multifactor
test for determining whether a defendant's mark is likely to cause confusion with
a plaintiff's mark.3' And while all courts agree that actual confusion is not
required for a finding of likelihood of confusion,32 actual confusion is often called
the "best evidence of likelihood of confusion" 33 because it provides tangible
instances of confusion that substantiates the amorphous "likelihood of
confusion" standard.34
Actual confusion also comes up in a second, improper context in which some
courts require a plaintiff to surmount the obstacle of proving actual confusion
before the plaintiff is eligible for monetary relief. In essence, courts that require
evidence of actual confusion before awarding monetary relief are double-counting
such evidence (i.e., once to determine liability and once to determine damages).
The courts are split on the propriety of requiring actual confusion before they
award monetary relief.35 Several circuits hold that evidence of actual confusion
is not necessary for a recovery of profits36 or damages.37 Others take the opposite
Confusion in Trademark Infingement Iitgation: Restraining Subjectiviy Through a Factor-BasedApproach to
Valuing Evidence, 2 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 117 (2004); Michael J. Allen, The Role ofActual
Confusion Evidence in Trademark Infnngement Litigation, 83 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1993).
" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
32 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 23:12 (collecting cases from each circuit for the proposition
that "the plaintiff is not required to prove any instances of actual confusion" in order to prove
infringement).
33 Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 1980).
3 E.g., Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement, Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 602-03 (8th Cir.
1999); Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 660 (4th
Cir. 1996); Exxon Cop., 628 F.2d at 506.
" E.g., James M. KoelemayJr.,A Practical Guide to Monetagy Relief in Trademark Infnngement Cases,
85 TRADEMARK REP. 263, 263 (1995) (stating that several questions divide the courts, including
whether bad faith, actual confusion, and actual injury are required for an accounting of profits or an
award of damages).
3 E.g., Grade v. Grade, 217 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) ("While actualconfusion may be
relevant as evidence of the likekhood of confusion (which is required for an award of profits under
S 1114), under our precedents a showing of actual confusion is not necessary to obtain a recovery
of profits."); Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 169 F.2d 779, 781 (11th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he law in this
Circuit is well settled that a plaintiff need not demonstrate actual damage to obtain an award
2007]
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view, holding that evidence of actual confusion is a prerequisite for any recovery
of profits3" or damages.
39
But perhaps the dominant view is that actual confusion is necessary to recover
damages, but not an accounting of profits.40 An example of this view is the
Second Circuit's decision in International Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy
Hiltiger, U.S.4., Inc.4' The plaintiff, the International Star Class Yacht Racing
Association (ISCYRA), is a nonprofit corporation that owns the rights to design
certain sailboats. 42 ISCYRA uses a five-pointed star as its insignia; one version of
this star is red, which is placed alongside the words "STAR CLASS. 4 3 Tommy
Hilfiger, a popular clothing designer, sold garments bearing the words "STAR
CLASS" with a five-pointed red star." The district court discussed actual
confusion as part of its analysis of whether there was any likelihood of
confusion.45 The only source of actual confusion was one ISCYRA member who
reflecting an infringer's profits under § 35 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117.").
"7 E.g., Choice Hotels Int'l, Inc. v. Pennave Assocs., 43 Fed. Appx. 517, 519 (3d Cir. 2002)
(holding, based on "the text of the statute itself," that the Lanham Act "does not require the actual
confusion be proved for an award of damages"); Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932
F.2d 1113, 1126 (5th Cir. 1991), affd, 505 U.S. 763 (19 92) (reecting the gum ent that "a men et_-r
award requires evidence of actual confusion").
38 E.g., MIcHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 7.03[C] (5th ed. 2006)
("To recover profits, a plaintiff must bear the burden of proving that it has been damaged by actual
confusion or deceptin as n result of the defendant's .infringement '
3 E.g., Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633,639 (7th Cit. 2003) ('To recover damages,
[the plaintiff] must show that the violation caused actual confusion among his customers and, as a
result, he suffered actual injury.'); Res. Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., 926
F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cit. 1991) ("When a plaintiff seeks money damages in either a product
infringement case or a false advertising case asserted under section 43(a), the plaintiff must introduce
evidence of actual consumer confusion."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 36
cmt. i (1995) ("[T]he recovery of damages ordinarily requires proof that some customers have
actually been confused or deceived.").
4 E.g., Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger, U.S.A., Inc., 80 F.3d 749, 753 (2d
Cir. 1996) (stating that actual confusion is required for money damages, but to recover profits, the
plaintiff must only show bad faith); Web Printing Controls Co. v. Oxy-Dry Corp., 906 F.2d 1202,
1205 (7th Cit. 1990) (stating that actual confusion is "essential to a recovery of damages," but that
a plaintiff can recover profits without actual confusion based on other factors, such as willfulness
or under a deterrence rationale); Teaching Co. Ltd. P'ship v. Unapix Entm't, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d
567, 588-89 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("[To recover monetary damages, a plaintiff must prove actual
confusion; however, to recover a monetary award of the defendant's profits, a plaintiff need not
prove actual confusion.").
" 80 F.3d 749 (2d Cit. 1996).
42 Id at 751.
43 Id
44 1Id.
41 Int'l Star Class Yacht Racing Ass'n v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 2663, 1995
WL 241875, *10-12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 1995).
[Vol. 14:205
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saw the Tommy Hilfiger goods and asked the ISCYRA if there was a royalty
agreement for Tommy Hilfiger's use.46 The district court held that this was "de
minimus" and thus did not support a likelihood of confusion.47 The district court
then fully imported this conclusion into its discussion of damages, holding that
"[b]ecause the evidence of actual confusion was 'de minimis' in this case,
[ISCYRA] has not met the requirements for an award of monetary damages. 48
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on damages, reasoning
that because ISCYRA did not prove actual confusion, it is not entitled to
damages.
49
The principal reason that courts advance to justify the requirement of actual
confusion is that actual confusion is evidence of actual injury, and actual injury is
required for any award of damages. In trademark infringement cases, a plaintiff
only recovers its actual damages, which, as with all torts, a plaintiff must prove
with reasonable certainty.5" But actual damages are hard to establish because
market-based harm is difficult to quantify given the multiplicity of factors that
affect whether companies succeed in the marketplace." Because of this difficulty,
courts reason that actual confusion is either the only evidence that is sufficient to
establish actual injury, or that actual confusion is the best surrogate for proof of
actual injury because evidence that consumers were actually confused shows that
the plaintiff was actually injured.52 In other words, without tangible instances of
46 Id at *12.
47 Id.
" Id. at *13. But see Zeknski, 335 F.3d at 639 (holding that if two people were possibly confused,
this is enough to constitute actual confusion).
49 Int'l Star Class Yacht RadngAss'n, 80 F.3d at 753.
o See Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1157 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Items alleged
as either unjust enrichment to the defendant or damages suffered by the plaintiff must, of course,
have been caused by the infringement itself; in addition the amount must be provable, although
some uncertainty in making this calculation is allowed."); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d
1400, 1407 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff must establish its damages from trademark
infringement "with reasonable certainty"); 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 30:72 (stating that "actual
damage in trademark law is "measured by the tort standard under which the infringer-tortfeasor is
liable for all injuries caused to plaintiff by the wrongful act"); TERRANCE P. Ross, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND REMEDIES § 4:03[1] (2006) ("[Dlamages that are too speculative
or too remote from the infringement are not recoverable."). Indeed, to be actionable, the Lanham
Act requires the use of a mark "which... is likely to cause confusion." 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)() (2000)
(emphasis added).
51 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. b (1995) ("In a competitive
market, proof of loss resulting from the wrongful conduct of a particular competitor is often
difficult. The plaintiff's sales are subject to a variety of forces, including business cycles, shifts in
consumer demand, and the legitimate marketing strategies of competitors.").
52 Stolte, Monetay Relief, supra note 3, at 240-41 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 36 cmt. i (1995)).
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actual confusion, courts doubt the plaintiff has suffered any actual injury that
deserves monetary relief.
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF WILLFULNESS
Like actual confusion, willfulness is a slippery concept, principally because
"willfulness" means different things to different courts. Depending on the court,
"willfulness" covers a range of mental states from mere knowledge to bad faith
to fraud. 3 I need not discuss these different interpretations because this Article
focuses on willfulness as a prerequisite to monetary relief. Accordingly, this
Article defines willfulness as any mental state that courts require before awarding
monetary relief.5 4
Courts are divided on whether to require willfulness before a plaintiff is
eligible for monetary relief. As one commentator noted, this division has
"resulted in a schizophrenic view of the remedy of an accounting of profits. 5 5
Several circuits hold that evidence of bad faith or willfulness is required for a
recovery of profits.5 6 Others hold that evidence of bad faith or willfulness is not
required for a recovery of profits."7 Still others have adopted their own complex
51 See Koelemay, supra note 35, at 268-69 (citing several examples of inconsistent usage); Stolte,
An Accounting of Profits, supra note 3, at 276-77 ("[T]he parameters of what constitutes bad faith or
willful infringement has never been sufficiently defined by the courts.").
' Another reason why willfulness is a difficult concept is that, like actual confusion, willfulness
(called intent) is part of each circuit's multifactor likelihood-of-confusion test described in Part II.
As a result, courts that require willfulness before awarding monetary relief are double-counting
evidence of willfulness.
" Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 864.
56 See W. Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.
2005) (recognizing the split of authority, but holding nonetheless that "we require a showing that
Defendant's actions were willful to support an award of profits under 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(a)");
Elizabeth L. Plitzuweit, Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Contessa: Courts Remain Split in Determining
StandardforAwarding Profits in Trademark Infringement Cases, INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL., Winter 2006,
at 5 (2006) (listing which circuits require a finding of willful infringement in order to award an
accounting of profits and which circuits do not); see also George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968
F.2d 1532, 1534 (2d Cit. 1992) (holding "that in order to justify an award of profits, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant engaged in willful deception"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 37 cmt. e (1995) ("The better view limits an accounting of profits to acts intended
to create confusion or to deceive prospective purchasers."). Butsee W. Divers ifedServs., Inc., 427 F.3d
at 1273 ("Even with a finding of willfulness, a court may still exercise its discretion to reduce or even
eliminate a profit award in the name of fashioning an equitable remedy to meet the needs of each
case.").
57 E.g., Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cit. 2006) ("[A]lthough
willfulness is a proper and important factor in an assessment of whether to make a damages award,
it is not an essential predicate thereto.'); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cit.
2005) (reversing its previous precedent and holding "that willfulness is an important equitable factor
12
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rules.5 8 There was some hope that the Supreme Court would resolve this circuit
split in response to a petition for certiorari on the question of "[w]hether
willfulness is a prerequisite for an award of profits for violations of Section
43(a)." 59 But the Supreme Court denied that petition without comment.60
The leading case holding that a plaintiff must prove willfulness before an
award of profits is the Second Circuit's Geoge Bascb Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc.61 In that
but not a prerequisite to such an award"); Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349
(5th Cit. 2002) ("In accordance with our previous decisions, and in light of the plain language of
§ 1117(a), however, we decline to adopt a bright-line rule in which a showing of willful infringement
is a prerequisite to an accounting of profits.'); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th
Cit. 1989) ("Other than general equitable considerations, there is no express requirement that the
parties be in direct competition or that the infringer wilfully infringe the trade dress to justify an
award of profits.").
5s See Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cit. 1993) (adopting the
following four-part rule: "1) a plaintiff seeking damages must prove actual harm, such as the
diversion of sales to the defendant; 2) a plaintiff seeking an accounting of defendant's profits must
show that the products directly compete, such that defendant's profits would have gone to plaintiff
if there was no violation; 3) the general rule of direct competition is loosened if the defendant acted
fraudulently or palmed off inferior goods, such that actual harm is presumed; and 4) where
defendant's inequitable conduct warrants bypassing the usual rule of actual harm, damages may be
assessed on an unjust enrichment or deterrence theory"); Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d
1400,1406 (9th Cit. 1993) (permitting an accounting of profits without proof of willfulness, but only
if the companies compete); Merchant Media, LLC v. H.S.M. Int'l, No. 05 Civ. 2817, 2006 WL
3479022, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30,2006) ("To be awarded profits under the Lanham Act, plaintiffs
must show that an infringer acted with willful deception, in addition to showing (1) the defendant's
unjust enrichment; (2) the plaintiff's damages from the infringement; or (3) that an accounting for
profits is necessary to deter future willful infringement.").
5 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has an unusual position on
whether an accounting of profits requires a finding of willfulness. In LUndy Pen Co., the court
permitted an accounting of profits without willfulness because there was a sufficient deterrence
rationale-namely, the litigants were competitors. 982 F.2d at 1406. But in the opinion that led to
the petition for certiorari, the Ninth Circuit denied a "request for disgorgement of profits because
of an absence of any evidence supporting a reasonable inference that any of the Defendants willfully
infringed [Contessa Food Products] alleged trademark." Contessa Food Prod. Inc. v. Lockpur Fish
Processing Co., 123 Fed. Appx. 747, 751 (9th Cit. 2005).
' See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
61 968 F.2d 1532 (2d Cit. 1992). The plaintiff filed a petition for certiorari on the following
question:
Whether Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act which provides that a plaintiff who
has established trade dress infringement shall be entided 'subject to the principles
of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits,' requires that a plaintiff must also
establish that a defendant acted with willful deception in committing the trade
dress infringement in order to recover such profits.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 506 U.S. 991 (1992) (No. 92-
530). The Supreme Court, however, denied that Petition. George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 506
U.S. 991 (1992).
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case, the plaintiff sued the defendants based on the similarity of the two
companies' packaging of their respective products.62 The district court held that
the plaintiff could not recover damages because, among other things, the plaintiff
had no evidence that the defendant intended to deceive the public.63 The district
court nonetheless allowed the case to go to trial and eventually permitted an
award of profits." The Second Circuit reversed, holding that while 5 1117(a)
"vests the district court with some decree of discretion[,] ... that discretion must
operate within legally defined parameters."65 The Second Circuit proceeded to
cabin this discretion by examining three theories of remedies for trademark
infringement and concluding that "under any theory, a finding of defendant's
willful deceptiveness is a prerequisite for awarding profits."66 Specifically, the
Second Circuit reasoned that an award of the defendant's profits (1) is a substitute
measure of the plaintiff s profits, but this is only fair if the defendant acted in bad
faith; (2) deprives the defendant of its unjust enrichment, but enrichment is only
unjust if there is a presumption that willfulness creates consumer confusion; and
(3) deters infringers by creating an economic disincentive to infringe another
trademark, but this disincentive only applies to willful actors.67 Based on these
theories, the Second Circuit concluded that willfulness is a requirement for an
award of profits68 and thus the district court erred in awarding profits without
proof of wilifulness. 6'
The principal reason that courts advance to justify their requirement of
willfulness is the courts' fear of creating a windfall for the plaintiff.7" Courts have
this fa because a n a earns.profits i1iui s.cvcall actioiJ .i .some oi
which involve the infringing mark.7" To award the plaintiff the entirety of the
defendants' profits, therefore, is to risk overcompensating the plaintiff for its
losses when only some of those losses are attributable to the infringement.7
62 George Bascb Co., 968 F.2d at 1534.
63 Id. at 1535.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1537.
66 I
67 Id at 1537-39.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1541.
71 Id. at 1540 ("So as to limit what may be an undue windfall to the plaintiff, and prevent the
potentially inequitable treatment of an 'innocent' or 'good faith' infringer, most courts require proof
of intentional misconduct before allowing a plaintiff to recover the defendant's profits."); see, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 37 cmt. e (1995) ("An award of the defendant's
profits creates a potential windfall to the plaintiff and a potential penalty to the defendant.').
71 See, e.g., id § 37 cmt. d ("The defendant bears the burden of establishing which, if any, of the
total sales are not attributable to the misconduct.').
72 See, e.g., id ("An accounting awards only profits on sales that are attributable to the defendant's
[Vol. 14:205
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol14/iss2/1
THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL
Accordingly, courts will only take this risk if they are satisfied that the infringer
acted willfully, reasoning that if the defendant is a bad actor, there is less. concern
about overcompensating the plaintiff because the defendant should bear the
burden of any uncertainties springing from its willful infringement.
73
IV. THE CURRENT MODEL, WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS OF ACTUAL
CONFUSION AND WILLFULNESS, CREATES SEVERAL PROBLEMS
The previous two Parts were descriptive: Part II describes the structure and
content of monetary relief under the Lanham Act, and Part III describes how
courts interpret the Lanham Act as requiring the plaintiff to prove actual
confusion or willfulness or both before that plaintiff is eligible for monetary relief.
This Part is evaluative, arguing against any such requirements by demonstrating
how they are contrary to law and policy. Specifically, this Part advances three
reasons why the current model is flawed. First, neither the history nor text of the
Lanham Act requires either actual confusion or willfulness before a successful
plaintiff is entitled to monetary relief. Second, and contrary to those arguments
advanced by certain courts, the rationales behind the current model do not
support either requirement. Third, the current model has caused jurisprudential
problems.
A. NEITHER THE HISTORY NOR TEXT OF THE LANHAM ACT SUPPORTS THE
CURRENT MODEL
Nothing about the Lanham Act's history or text requires the plaintiff to prove
actual confusion or willfulness before it is eligible for monetary relief. It is thus
unsurprising that courts do not focus on the history and text of the Lanham Act
when explaining their requirements of actual confusion or willfulness.74 Courts
instead usually cite the rule in their circuit and then apply that rule.75 If the court
gives any justification for that rule at all, it is almost always based on several
policies that I debunk in the next subpart. Unlike the courts, therefore, I begin
wrongful conduct.").
" Id § 36 cmt. j (stating that courts may presume that "a defendant who intends to divert sales
from the plaintiff through an infringement or misrepresentation is likely to have succeeded").
" Stolte, An Accounting of Profits, supra note 3, at 272 ("Indeed, most courts which have adopted
these unwritten limitations to the statutory remedies have done so on the strength of prior court
decisions and the Restatement and not on a thorough review of these limitations in the context of
the Lanham Act itself or on an examination of the Act's legislative history.").
" Id. at 296 ("Rather than rely on the language of the Lanham Act itself or the legislative history,
proponents of the bad faith requirement look to policy considerations to support their position.').
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my argument against the current model by analyzing the text and history of the
Lanham Act.
Canonical statutory construction begins and ends with the language of a
statute if that language is plain.76 It is also established canon that a statute should
be construed such that no clause or word is superfluous. 7 Any requirement of
actual confusion or willfulness violates both of these canons.
First, any requirement that a plaintiff prove actual confusion, willfulness, or
anything else contravenes the text of 15 U.S.C. § 1171 (a), which imposes none of
these requirements.' Instead, the statute states that a plaintiff "shall be entitled"
to defendant's profits, plaintiff's damages, and costs, "subject to the principles of
equity. ' '79  While courts obviously use the "principles of equity" language to
import their requirements of actual confusion or willfulness, this importation is
beyond the plain, unambiguous text of the Lanham Act. Its text broadly refers
to any "principles of equity," not just actual confusion and willfulness.
Second, any requirement would render the following sentence from § 1117(a)
superfluous: "If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on
profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter
judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances
of the case."8 This sentence makes clear that Congress gave courts authority to
raise or lower the amount of profits awarded based on "the circumstances of the
case." But suppose, for example, that a court follows its requirement that it
cannot award profits unless the plaintiff proves willfulness. Suppose further that,
based on the circumstances of that case, the court finds that not awarding profits
produces an inadequate result. In that situation, the court would be confined by
its rule even though the Lanham Act would mandate the court to "enter judgment
for such sum as the court shall find to be just."''. Accordingly, the current model
reads this sentence out of the statute, rendering it superfluous.82
76 I.N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183,189 (1984) ('This Court has noted on numerous occasions
that in all cases involving statutory construction, our starting point must be the language employed
by Congress, and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used.") (citation and alterations omitted).
" TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of statutory
construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.') (citation and quotations
omitted).
78 See Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 174 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that "the
Lanham Act gives little guidance on the equitable principles to be applied by a court in making an
award of damages').
79 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
o Id. (emphasis added).
81 id.
82 Some courts make a different statutory-construction argument by relying on a 1999
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The current model, based on extra-statutory requirements of actual confusion
or willfulness, does not satisfy the basic rules of statutory construction. But to
take statutory construction to the next level, I will briefly survey the extensive
historical analyses performed by others.83
Previous commentators have sifted through this history and come to different
conclusions. Some commentators focus on the history of the Lanham Act itself
and conclude that Congress did not intend any requirement of actual confusion
or willfulness before a plaintiff can recover monetary relief.84 This history
includes draft legislation proposing a bad-faith requirement that was not
adopted,"5 as well as statements by several representatives that there was no bad-
amendment to § 1117(a), which substituted "a violation under section 43(a), or a willful violation
under section 43(c)," for "or a violation under section 43(a)." Trademark Amendments Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 106-43, § 1118(c)(1), 113 Stat. 218, 219 (1999). E.g., R&R Partners, Inc. v. Tovar, No.
03:04-CV-00145, 2007 WL 1202802, *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 23,2007) (stating that although "[t]he Ninth
Circuit has previously required a showing of willful infringement as a prerequisite to recovery of an
infringer's profits when the parties are not in direct competition," the court holds that "[t]he plain
language of [the 1999] amendment indicates that Congress intended to condition monetary awards
for Section 43(c) violations on a finding ofwillfulness, but not Section 43(a) violations"); Gucci Am.,
Inc. v. Exclusive Imps. Int'l, No. 99 Civ. 11490, 2007 WL 840128, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2007)
("Congress' 1999 revision makes plain that willfulness is a prerequisite for the awarding of profits,
damages, and costs under § 43(c) of the Lanham Act. It is not a statutogy prerequisite for the
awarding of profits, damages, and costs under §§ 43(a) and (d).'). These courts have even gone so
far as to reverse their precedent and, based on the addition of "willful" in 1999, hold "that
willfulness is an important equitable factor but not a prerequisite to such an award." Banjo Buddies,
Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 2005). While this statutory construction supports my
argument that neither actual confusion nor willfulness is part of § 1117(a), I cannot support this
argument because the addition of "willful" did not change the requirements of the Lanham Act for
traditional infringement, but was meant merely to address dilution cases. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra
note 15, § 30:62 (describing the purpose of the amendment).
83 Several articles discuss the historical development of these court-created obstacles. See, e.g.,
Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 874-89 (2002) (discussing the development of the bad-faith
requirement in an accounting of profits); Corgill, supranote 27, at 1915-24 (surveying the history and
rationale of an accounting of profits); Koelemay, supra note 35, at 266-81 (discussing the
development of actual confusion, bad faith, and purpose-based requirements); Stolte,AnAccounfing
of Profits, supra note 3, at 273--84 (discussing the development of the requirement that a plaintiff must
prove bad faith to receive an accounting of profits, and concluding that there is no support for such
a requirement); and Stolte, Monetary Relif, spra note 3, at 233-42 (discussing the requirement that
a plaintiff must prove actual confusion to receive a monetary recovery).
84 See Stolte, An Accounting of Profits, supra note 3, at 294-99 (reviewing various sources of
legislative history and concluding that "the legislative history is also silent on a bad faith
requirement').
8" See Stolte, Monetary Relief smpra note 3, at 295 n.127 (describing a draft of the legislation that
was proposed but omitted in the final draft that would become the Lanham Act and that includes
a provision that "there shall be no recovery of profits from any defendant whose adoption and use
of an infringing trade-mark was in good faith and without knowledge of the plaintiffs right
17
Almeling: The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model: A Better Way to Award Monetar
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2007
J. INTELL PROP. L
faith requirement. 6 Other commentators focus on the structure of the Lanham
Act and conclude that when Congress wanted to create specific requirements,
such as a heightened standard for infringement, they did so explicitly.8" This
argument is persuasive because there are several provisions of the Lanham Act
that explicitly impose a requirement of willfulness, such as the dilution statute
passed in 2006,8 the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act that requires
a "bad faith intent,' 8 9 and the provision of trademark infringement for printers
that requires "knowledge that such imitation is intended to be used to cause
confusion or to cause mistake, or to deceive."90 In contrast to these
commentators, others have examined the history of the Lanham Act and
monetary relief in early trademark infringement cases and concluded that the
plaintiff must prove either actual confusion or willfulness.9 This history includes
the evolution of monetary awards that derive from centuries of common-law
cases that often imposed these requirements based on the strictures of equity
courts.
9 2
The only conclusion from reviewing the history of the Lanham Act is that
there is no conclusive answer for what circumstances entitle a plaintiff to
monetary relief. Before the Lanham Act, courts had discretion and adopted
inconsistent rules.93 After the Lanham Act, Congress gave discretion to the
thereto').
" Se&at 96n.10 qjus"ws ttfrom a 1947 hndbook)Jfl.
87 See Conway-Jones, supra note 3, at 864-65 ('With the recent addition of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) and the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA),
it is becoming increasingly clear that Congress intends a straightforward interpretation that bad faith
is not required before the Lanham Act remedies become available to a trademark owner for
infringement of either a registered or unregistered trademark."); see also Stolte, AnAccounfing ofProfits,
supra note 3, at 293 ("If Congress wished to predicate the remedy of an accounting on proof of an
infringer's bad faith, it could have added an express requirement to this effect in Section 35 of the
Lanham Act.").
' Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006).
89 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
915 U.S.C. §1114(l) (2000).
91 James M. Koelemay, Jr., Monetay Relieffor Trademark Infringement Under the Lanham Act, 72
TRADEMARK REP. 458, 545-46 (1982).
92 Id. at 460 ("Many of the rules governing monetary recovery in trademark actions are found
nowhere within the four comers of Section 35, but derive instead from the common law and from
decisions under earlier trademark statutes and under copyright and patent statutes. An
understanding of the history of the remedies for trademark infringement is a necessary foundation
for understanding Section 35.'). Mr. Koelemay provides a detailed archaeology of monetary awards
in trademark cases from the seventeenth century until the Lanham Act in 1946. See id. at 460-95.
This history includes a description of monetary awards under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 that, like
the 1946 Lanham Act, left "the questions of entitlement to relief and the measure of relief to be
answered by courts." Id. at 474.
9' Id. at 475-87, 495.
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courts and no consistency has emerged.94 As summarized by one commentator
more than twenty years ago, in adopting the 1946 Lanham Act, Congress sought
to codify the decisions interpreting the 1905 Act:
Unfortunately, judicial decisions prior to 1946 were not in
agreement as to the circumstances justifying monetary relief, and
efforts by the drafters of the Lanham Act to clarify the right did not
survive the legislative process. Thus, [the Lanham Act], by its
silence, left to the courts the task of organizing the rules of recovery
into a coherent and rational scheme. To date, no satisfactory
scheme has emerged.95
In the end, legislative and judicial history is inconclusive and only reveals that
courts do not agree on whether there should be any requirement of actual
confusion or willfulness. This inquiry into history thus ends where it began:
because the statute is unambiguous, the current model contravenes the text and
purpose of the Lanham Act.
B. POLICY RATIONALES USED TO JUSTIFY THE CURRENT MODEL FAIL TO JUSTIFY
REQUIREMENTS OF ACTUAL CONFUSION OR WILLFULNESS
Because neither the text nor history of the Lanham Act supports the courts'
requirements of actual confusion or willfulness, courts justify their decisions
based on various rationales. Without exception, these rationales do not compel
any such requirement.
First, and as described in Part III.A, the main reason that courts invoke to
justify their requirement of actual confusion is that actual confusion is evidence
of actual injury, which is required for any award of damages. Courts reason that
actual confusion is either the only evidence that is sufficient to establish actual
injury or at least that actual confusion is the best surrogate for proof of actual
injury because evidence that consumers were actually confused shows that the
plaintiff was actually injured.96 But either view-actual confusion is the only type
of actual injury or is a good surrogate for actual injury-is far too limiting.
14 Id at 495--505.
" Id. at 495. Some courts and commentators cite to Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S.
125 (1947), as a case holding that the Supreme Court requires willfulness. But as pointed out many
times before, Champion advanced no such rule. See, e.g., Stolte, An Accounting of Profits, supra note 3,
at 282-83 (arguing that it is "an incorrect reading" to suggest that Champion requires willfulness, and
stating that the correct reading is that willfulness is one factor among many to consider); Conway-
Jones, supra note 3, at 878-79 (same).
96 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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The Lanham Act permits the plaintiff to recover "any damages sustained by
the plaintiff."97  A plaintiff can thus recover for any injury caused by the
defendant, of which actual confusion is only one such injury. Other categories
of injuries include the trademark owner's lost profits, price erosion, damage to
goodwill, the costs of corrective advertising, a reasonable royalty, defendant's
profits, and statutory damages.9" These broad categories can only hint at the
number of situations in which a plaintiff can be injured, and thus eligible for
damages.99 For an example of one such unusual situation, the Sixth Circuit
awarded a plaintiff damages caused by having to defend future product-liability
suits based on the defendant's defective yet confusingly similar products.'0t As
demonstrated by this example and many other cases granting relief based on
unique facts, a singular focus on actual confusion is too limiting.
Second, and as described in Part II.B, the principal reason courts invoke to
justify the requirement of willfulness is the fear of creating a windfall for the
plaintiff. This fear of windfall profits is rational: the defendant's profits may not
be coterminous with the plaintiff's damages. The courts' response to this
fear-imposing the requirement of willfulness-is both unnecessary and wrong.
It is unnecessary because the Lanham Act already gives the defendant the power
to limit the plaintiff's recovery to only those profits that are related to the
infringement. Specifically, the Lanham Act provides that "[i]n assessing profits
the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant's sales only; defendant must
prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed.' 1  In other words, if the
97 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 36 cmt. i (1995) ("Once the fact of loss caused by the defendant's misconduct has
been established, the plaintiff's burden may be satisfied by evidence that furnishes a reasonable basis
for computing damages. The plaintiff is not obliged to provide individualized proof of lost sales.").
9 See Ross, supra note 50, § 4:03 (describing each type).
9 See Koelemay, supra note 35, at 283 (describing other categories of damages that courts have
awarded: "(a) extra marketing support paid to a franchisee that competed with the infringer; (b)
profits or franchisee fees lost due to delay in entering a market; (c) the cost of defending future
mistaken product liability claims; (d) lost profits or royalties on future sales the plaintiff would have
made to a defendant-distributor if the distributor had not begun selling infringing goods; (e)
franchise fees not paid by a terminated 'hold-over' franchisee; (0 the anticipated cost of developing
a replacement franchisee; and (g) attorneys' fees incurred in taking action against retailers that
purchased infringing goods from the defendant").
100 Broan Mfg. Co. v. Associated Distribs., Inc., 923 F.2d 1232, 1238 (6th Cit. 1991) (accepting
the following chain of causation: "(1) [defendant's] 'knock-off' bathroom fan units are of inferior
quality; (2) a certain number of those products will fail in the future, causing fires; (3) some of
[defendant's] products which cause fires will be misidentified as [plaintiff's] products; and (4) of
those that are misidentified as [plaintiff's] products, a numberwill result in claims against [plaintiff],
which will result in investigative and defense costs and, in some cases where fire renders the fan's
manufacturer unidentifiable, settlements to claimants").
101 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
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defendant can apportion its profits, then the plaintiff is given the appropriate
amount and not a windfall. If the defendant cannot apportion its profits, equity
supports the view that, having already been held liable for infringement, it is the
defendant who should suffer the consequences of its own failure to apportion its
profits."2 Thus, adding willfulness as a barrier to windfall profits is unnecessary
because the defendant, already liable for trademark infringement, has the power
to protect itself."0 3
The courts' response of imposing a willfulness requirement is also wrong
because in attempting to prevent the plaintiff from receiving a windfall, the courts
give the infringer a windfall. The courts' myopic focus on willfulness ignores the
many situations in which a defendant was not willful, but was still significantly
enriched by free riding on the plaintiffs mark."° In such a case, a willfulness
requirement prevents the plaintiff from receiving any of this unjust enrichment,
leaving the defendant free to keep its ill-gotten gains. 5
C. THE CURRENT MODEL CREATES JURISPRUDENTIAL PROBLEMS
The goals for adopting the requirements of actual confusion and willfulness
were to make the law governing monetary relief predictable and determinate.
These goals are ill-served by the current model that has spawned a host of
exceptions and exceptions-to-exceptions that have proliferated into a complicated
body of law. Take the requirement of actual confusion, for example. All courts
agree that actual confusion is difficult to establish and offer into evidence," yet
102 Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 606 (6th Cir. 1991), quoting Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Mfg. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1942) ("There may be a windfall
to the trade-mark [sic] owner where it is impossible to isolate the profits which are attributable to
the use of the infringing mark. But to hold otherwise would give the windfall to the wrongdoer.").
103 The Lanham Act also imposes yet another check on windfalls, which permits courts to use
their discretion and "enter such judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just," but that
sum "shall constitute compensation and not a penalty." 15 U.S.C. 5 1117(a).
"4 See Stolte, An Accounting of Profits, supra note 3, at 298 ("Essentially, a stringent bad faith
requirement will never result in a windfall to a trademark owner, but may very well result in an
automatic windfall to an infringer who, regardless of intent, takes a free ride on the trademark
owner's good will."). For an example of such free riding, see infra HYPOTHETICAL 3: THE
INNOCENT, BUT FREE-RIDING DEFENDANT in Part V.C.
105 While these seem to be the primary reasons for the current model, courts and commentators
have advanced others. Seegeneraly, e.g., Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th
Cir. 1987) (arguing that the defendant's profits are the best measure of the plaintiff's damages
available); Robert G. Bone, Enforrement Costs and Trademark PuZks, 90 VA. L. REV. 2099, 2102-81
(2004) (arguing that the enforcement costs of bringing a trademark case and error costs of over- and
under-enforcement account for many trademark doctrines, including the requirement of actual
confusion).
10" See Stolte, Monetary Relief, supra note 3, at 245-50 (chronicling the practical and evidentiary
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several courts have adopted it as a requirement for monetary relief'"7 To
ameliorate the harshness of this requirement, some courts have created a
presumption that once a plaintiff proves willfulness, the plaintiff is entitled to a
presumption of actual confusion.' ° Other courts note that "direct proof of actual
confusion or deception is often unavailable, and the proof may consist instead of
circumstantial evidence such as consumer surveys, market analysis, or the nature
of the defendant's misconduct."' 0 9  The problem, however, is that these
exceptions lead to practical problems, such as determining what level of
willfulness is necessary to overcome a failure to prove actual confusion.
Another way in which these requirements create jurisprudential problems is
the different, and often competing, ways in which courts define actual confusion
and willfulness. As described in Part III.A, some courts have a low threshold for
actual confusion, while other courts require much more.' And as described in
Part JII.B, some courts hold that knowledge is enough to establish willfulness
whereas other cases require affirmative bad intent."' These differing standards
show how the current model fails to achieve equity. Requirements like actual
confusion and willfulness were meant to simplify a court's analysis: if there is no
confusion or willfulness, there is no monetary relief. But equity is not so simple.
As a result, courts have had to find play in the joints. So instead of focusing on
whether there is actual confusion or willfulness, courts focus on what kind of
actual confusion or willfulness qualifies for monetary relief. Courts are still
engaging in an analysis of the equities, but they are doing so within narrow and
incomplete categories. At best, these categories are rough measures of the
equities; at worst, they limit a court's ability to achieve justice between the parties.
Yet another problem with the current model is that it obscures a court's true
reasoning. By adopting requirements of actual confusion and willfulness, courts
are foreclosed from evaluating all of the equities in a case. Courts instead must
cabin their analysis to two factors that arise frequently in trademark
difficulties of proving actual confusion); see alsogeneral Robins, supra note 30 (listing the difficulties
inherent in actual confusion evidence and suggesting a multi-factor test for evaluating such
evidence).
107 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
10 George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding a
"rebuttable presumption of consumer confusion" if the defendant's actions were intentionally
deceptive). But see Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(applying Eighth Circuit law and holding that "[t]he District Court erred in concluding that under
Eighth Circuit law actual confusion could be presumed from defendants' intent to copy the overall
package design. Consequently, there is a complete absence of proof of actual confusion, the required
element in plaintiff's claim for monetary relief.").
109 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 36 cmt. i (1995).
110 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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litigation-actual confusion and willfulness. These factors are just part of the
equitable picture that a court considers. But to the extent a court considers the
broader equitable landscape, it must obscure its true reasoning by couching its
decisions in terms of actual confusion or willfulness. In an attempt to explain
their reasoning, courts frequently point to the various policy rationales that
support monetary awards. These include deterrence, compensation, and unjust
enrichment."' But the courts have widely differing tolerances for these rationales,
with some accepting all of them113 and others only some.'14 It would improve the
transparency of decisions, and thus the process of decisionmaking, if courts were
not forced to limit their explanations to two categories, but could instead consider
all of the equitable reasons or theories that favor and disfavor monetary relief.
V. THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL
While the previous Parts described and criticized the current model in which
courts require actual confusion or willfulness before awarding monetary relief, this
Part advances a solution to the problems caused by the current model. This Part
begins with a description of the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model and then
explains how it solves each of the problems of the current model. This Part
concludes with three examples to show how this model will work in practice.
A. THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL, DEFINED
Although several courts interpret the Lanham Act as creating requirements of
actual confusion or willfulness, this Article argues that the Lanham Act establishes
an Infringement-Plus-Equity Model. The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model states
that the plaintiff must prove (1) infringement plus (2) some equitable reason why
it is entitled to monetary relief. This Article does not and cannot exhaustively list
all of the equitable factors that a court could consider because it is impossible to
catalogue the myriad ways in which infringement occurs. Instead, courts must
examine the circumstances of each case when deciding whether to award
monetary relief. "Some equitable reason" is thus as infinite as the number of
factual situations that arise in trademark litigation.
112 Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989).
113 E.g., Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 178 (3d Cir. 2005) (viewing the three
rationales disjunctively and stating "any one will do").
114 E.g., ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958,969 (D.C. Cit. 1990) (rejecting
the view that deterrence alone is sufficient for monetary relief because "deterrence is too weak and
too easily invoked a justification for the severe and often cumbersome remedy of a profits award").
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Nevertheless, "some equitable reason" certainly includes actual confusion and
willfulness. These doctrines have, after all, developed over the centuries for valid
reasons and are important. Other equitable factors"' include all established
equitable principles, such as unclean hands, laches, acquiescence,16 as well as any
of the dozens of other factors that, even though they do not fall in the classical
equity category, courts have considered relevant,"' such as the amount of
attorneys' fees or other relief awarded,"' any discovery misconduct that
prejudiced the defendant," 9 and the parties' respective sizes and financial
"' These equitable principles, while used primarily by the plaintiff in arguing that it is entitled to
monetary relief, cut both ways. That is, defendants can also argue that, based on the equities, the
plaintiff is not entitled to monetary relief.
116 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIRCOMPETION §§ 36(3), 37(2) (1995) (describing these
three as some of the factors that courts should consider in awarding damages); see, e.g., Reno Air
Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) ("Laches is an equitable time
limitation on a party's right to bring suit... [and] is a valid defense to Lanham Act claims." (quoting
Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, 304 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and
citations omitted))). Powerhouse Marks LLC v. Chi Hsin Impex, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 2d 733,739-40
(E.D. Mich. 2006) (refusing to award profits based on several reasons, including that the trademark
owner was aware of the defendant's use of the mark for at least five years).
117 See Koelemay, supra note 35, at 271-76 (listing twenty-two factors that courts have considered
relevant in their willfulness analysis).
"' Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp., 256 F.3d 1050, 1056 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming the
district court's refusal to award defendant's profits, even though there was willful infringement,
because the plaintiff was already adequately compensated by the court's $100,000 award in attorney's
fees).
19 Wynn Oil Co. v. Am. Way Serv. Corp., 943 F.2d 595, 605-16 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing a
district court's refusal to grant speculative profits because defendant's furtive discovery tactics were
the source of speculation). Some courts are already considering numerous factors, such as the Third,
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, which list six, nonexclusive factors that courts can use in deciding
whether to award profits:
(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether sales
have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any unreasonable
delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public interest in making the
misconduct unprofitable, and (6) whether it is a case of palming off.
Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky,
399 F.3d 168,175 (3d Cir. 2005); Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338,349 (5th Cir.
2002) (quoting Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 181 Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998)). Importantly,
these courts recognize that these factors are nonexclusive, and thus courts can consider all relevant
factors. E.g., Synergishic Intl, 470 F.3d at 176 (stating that "although each trademark dispute is fact
specific, the foregoing factors, as well as others that may be relevant in the circumstances, should
guide a court's consideration of the damages issue"). District courts in these circuits follow this
multi-factor test and consider other factors were relevant. E.g., Synergistic Int'l, LLC v. Korman,
No. 2:05CV49, 2007 WL 517677, at *5-12 (E.D. Va. Feb. 8, 2007) (applying these six factors and
two others-knowledge short of willfulness and use of other trade names without regard to others'
rights-in deciding what profits to award); Merisant Co. v. McNeil Nutritionals, LLC, No. 04-5504,
2007 WL 707359, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2007) (denying a motion for summary judgment because
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conditions.2 ° Applicable factors also include various economic theories,
including whether the parties are competitors 121 'and whether there is unjust
enrichment or a need for deterrence."2
Given this wide-ranging list of potential equitable considerations, the burden
is on the plaintiff to plead facts to justify monetary relief. In most cases, this will
be easy. The obvious equitable factors (e.g., actual confusion, willfulness,
competition, laches, unclean hands, the adequacy of other remedies) are well
known. In other cases, however, the plaintiff needs the flexibility to plead a novel
theory. In such cases courts should be more circumspect before accepting a
novel theory, but circumspection is better than the outright refusal.
B. THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL SOLVES THE PROBLEMS OF THE
CURRENT MODEL
The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model solves each of the problems caused by
the current model. First, the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model, with its broad
grant of discretion that permits courts to consider each of the equitable reasons
to grant or deny monetary relief, better comports with the text of the Lanham Act
than the current model. The Lanham Act is broadly written and provides that
after a plaintiff proves infringement, it "shall be entitled" to defendant's profits,
plaintiffs damages, and costs, "subject to the principles of equity.' '123 There is no
requirement of actual confusion and/or willfulness; there is only the broad grant
of authority to award monetary relief that comports with the "principles of
equity."
Second, the current model does not implement the policies that are meant to
support it. The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model, on the other hand, better
executes these policies. Part IV described the main rationales used to justify
there were issues of material facts regarding these six factors).
120 E.g., Synergistic Int'l, 2007 WL 517644, at *10 (stating "that, in awarding damages, it would
consider the Defendant's financial information as established by the evidence").
121 See, e.g., Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993) (adopting
a four-part rule for awarding profits, in which the second factor requires "that the products directly
compete, such that defendant's profits would have gone to plaintiff if there was no violation"); Lindy
Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993) (permitting an accounting of profits
without proof of willfulness, but only if the companies compete); CoUegenet, Inc. v. XAP Corp., No.
03-CV-1229, 2007 WL 927946, *6 (D. Or. Mar. 26, 2007) ("Accordingly, disgorgement of profits
in direct-competition cases may be necessary 'to secure the return of all profits' to the plaintiff.').
12 E.g., W. Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir.
2005) ("An award of profits in the absence of actual damages is usually predicated on one of two
theories: (1) unjust enrichment; or (2) deterrence.').
123 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
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actual confusion and willfulness. 124 Courts justify the requirement of actual
confusion by stating that actual confusion is necessary to show actual injury.12
But as shown above,'26 actual confusion is only one type of actual injury; the
Lanham Act, in contrast, permits the plaintiff to recover "any damages sustained
by the plaintiff.'' 127 The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model is broad enough to
permit courts to consider the various kinds of damages plaintiffs can suffer.
Furthermore, courts justify the requirement of willfulness as necessary to avoid
giving the plaintiff a windfall recovery.'28 But if the courts are concerned about
a windfall, it is better to address that concern directly than to rely on an imperfect
surrogate. The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model permits courts to consider the
circumstances of each case and, if an award of damages would be a windfall, to
deny recovery by the amount of that windfall.
Another reason that justifies the current model, although not frequently stated
by courts, is that an injunction is very easy to get in a trademark case and that
something more should be required for monetary relief. The leading
commentator on trademark law describes the concern well:
Perhaps one explanation for judicial uncertainty as to monetary
awards in these cases is the view that while injunctive relief is largely
a matter of strict liability, monetary relief should require "something
more." That is, injunctive relief is generally granted upon a strong
showing of a "likelihood of confusion" and neither proof of actual
confusion nor proof of intent or w-llfulness is required. But when
it comes to making an award of monetary relief for past acts of
infringement, judges are hesitant to do so, whether it is labeled
"damages," "profits" or "attorney fees," without that indefinable
cc ,121something more.
In response to this concern that "something more" is required for monetary
relief, courts have created two such somethings-actual confusion and willfulness.
But these requirements are both over- and under-inclusive. They are over-
inclusive because there are some situations in which a plaintiff can prove neither
actual confusion nor willfulness, but the equities still support monetary relief.
124 See supra Part IV.B.
125 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
127 See 15 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2000)..
12 See supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
129 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 30:58 (footnotes omitted); see also Ross, supra note 50, § 4.02
("In effect, a defendant can be liable for trademark infringement without having actually injured the
owner of the mark and without fault on its part (the so-called, 'innocent infringer').').
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They are also under-inclusive because there are some situations in which the
equities do not warrant monetary relief, even when the plaintiff can prove actual
confusion or willfulness.
In contrast to the courts' failed attempt to solve the "something more"
problem by erecting per se requirements, the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model is
sufficiently flexible to permit courts to deny relief if the plaintiff has not shown
"something more." In order to get monetary relief in addition to an injunction,
the plaintiff must prove infringementplus some equitable reason why it is entitled
to monetary relief. In other words, the plaintiff would still have to prove this
"something more," but this "something more" would not be limited to the two
limited per se requirements.
Third, the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model solves the jurisprudential
problems of the current model. As described in Part IV.c, the current model,
with its veneer of simplicity, has created problems as courts that adopt the
requirements of actual confusion or willfulness quickly retreat from the draconian
effects of the requirements by carving out exceptions.13 The Infringement-Plus-
Equity Model, in contrast, is specifically designed to consider any of the varied
circumstances that may arise in trademark litigation.
The obvious retort to my argument is that courts adopted the current model
because the world of equity was too amorphous, and thus the Infringement-Plus-
Equity Model does not provide enough guidance about when courts should award
monetary relief. The problem with this retort is that it is not the world of equity
that is too amorphous, it is that the world of trademark litigation is. The
economic value of trademarks and the effects of infringement have always been
difficult to quantify. As the economics of trademarks have changed and become
more sophisticated, 3' the world of trademark litigation has become even more
amorphous. But the solution is not to throw up our hands, state we cannot
evaluate the equities of each case, and rely on two limited, imperfect doctrines of
actual confusion and willfulness. Such a solution is contrary to the primary goal
of the Lanham Act, which is to achieve equity between the parties' 32 and make
infringement unprofitable. 133 Rather, the only solution is to give courts the
130 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
131 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687,
1687 (1999) ("The economics of trademarks and advertising has grown increasingly sophisticated
over [the past fifty years].').
132 Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int'l, Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2000) ('The goal behind
1116 and 1117 remedies is to achieve equity between or among the parties.").
133 Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The trial
court's primary function is to make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing
party.'); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 692 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[Trial
courts carefully fashion remedies which will take all the economic incentive out of trademark
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discretion to evaluate all of the circumstances and, based on the equities, decide
whether to award monetary relief.
C. THREE EXAMPLES OF HOW THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL SOLVES
THE PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT MODEL
The current model limits those situations that deserve monetary relief to
situations in which the plaintiff can prove actual confusion or willfulness. But
actual confusion and willfulness are only two of the many equitable factors that
support monetary relief. The current model, therefore, is unduly harsh on
litigants in situations in which actual confusion and willfulness are not present.
This subpart advances three hypotheticals that show situations in which the
requirements of actual confusion and/or willfulness would unfairly deny or grant
monetary relief, and how an Infringement-Plus-Equity Model would better fit
these cases.'
3 4
HYPOTHETICAL NO. 1: THE NEFARIOUS DEFENDANT
Consider a hypothetical market for wine glasses. The market leader sold
"Taste-Right" glasses, which set the standards for premium, hand-blown crystal
stemware. But bad times had fallen on the company and it was creeping towards
bankruptcy. A clever, nefarious defendant adopted the mark "Taste-It-Right" for
will ...... - wl -_- I a.t.......-ig..t lass.o but lyigo the advice of
counsel that, based on the niche, sophisticated market for premium stemware,
customers would not be confused. As a result of the competition and the
similarity of the marks, the defendant hastened the demise of the market leader.
"Taste-Right" sued and, despite the good-faith noninfringement opinion letter
from counsel, the court found likelihood of confusion. But an injunction does
not help "Taste-Right" because it is out of business, meaning that its only hope
for recovery is monetary relief. The nefarious defendant was clever, however,
because it knew that in its circuit, the good-faith (even if wrong) advice of counsel
prevented a finding of willfulness.'35 Under the requirement of willfulness, if
infringement.").
1"4 These three examples can only hint at the potentially infinite number of circumstances in
which the equities support or do not support an award of monetary damages, but the current model
compels a different outcome. But all of these examples reiterate the same argument that is the
central premise of this Article: because of the varying situations that arise in trademark cases, courts
need the flexibility to evaluate those situations without having to limit their inquiry to the two
incomplete categories of actual confusion and willfulness.
13 E.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 962 (7th Cir. 1992) ("A
party who acts in reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel regarding a close question of
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there is no willfulness then there is no accounting of profits. The nefarious
defendant also knew that, based on the reasonable-certainty standard of
recovering damages, it would be too speculative to determine how much longer
the plaintiff would have been in business, meaning that there were no damages.
Thus, even though the defendant infringed plaintiff's mark by intentionally
selecting an infringing mark, and even though defendant benefited from that
infringement, the court was constrained by its requirement of willfulness and thus
could not award any monetary relief.
While the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model does not lessen the regular, tort-
based rules of reasonable certainty, and thus would likewise not have permitted
an award of damages, the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model would permit an
accounting of profits. In awarding profits, the court would note that while there
was no willfulness because of the advice of counsel, there was still sufficient
knowledge (i.e., "Taste-It-Right" knew about "Taste-Right" and its financial
troubles), intent (i.e., "Taste-It-Right" selected a similar mark to benefit from the
mark of the market leader), and injury (i.e., as a proximate result of "Taste-It-
Right," "Taste-Right" went out of business faster than it otherwise would have).
Alternatively, the court could also base an accounting of profits on the need to
deter future nefarious defendants and prevent any unjust enrichment from such
infringement.'36 Either way, the point is that the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model
is sufficiently flexible to permit a court to consider all of the relevant factors and
equitably award monetary relief.
HYPOTHETICAL No. 2: THE ARDUOUS BURDEN OF ACTUAL CONFUSION
In the market for tennis racquets, imagine that the color of a player's strings
signifies the brand of string, and imagine that most tennis players can easily tell
certain brands by certain colors. The most-recognizable brand had the venerable
mark "Royal Purple," which demands a premium for its dark violet strings. For
purposes of social commentary, a progressive competitor adopted the mark "The
People's Purple," which used lighter colors of purple, including mauve, lavender,
and magenta. "The People's Purple" never made a profit, but it injured the
market position of "Royal Purple" by damaging the goodwill of its once-premium
status (i.e., people were less willing to buy "Royal Purple" out of fear of appearing
trademark law generally does not act in bad faith.').
136 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFUNFAIRCOMPETITION § 37 cmt. b (1995) (chronicling the history
of the accounting-of-profits remedy, and stating that "courts gradually adopted the view that in an
appropriate case an accounting of the defendant's profits could be awarded to prevent unjust
enrichment and to deter future infringement").
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elitist), and by forcing "Royal Purple" to institute a corrective-advertising
campaign to restore its image.
The trial was marked by dueling experts: because they used different
methodologies, the expert for "Royal Purple" found actual confusion while the
expert for "The People's Purple" did not. The court believed the expert for "The
People's Purple," finding that most tennis players would not be confused because
they can easily recognize "Royal Purple" by its color and would see "The People's
Purple" as a parody. The court nonetheless found that "The People's Purple"
was likely to be confused with "Royal Purple," based on several factors, including
the similarity of the marks, the strength of the plaintiffs mark, the proximity of
the goods, and the proximity of the channels of distribution."37 But the Court
denied the request from "Royal Purple" for monetary relief because of its
requirements of actual confusion and willfulness. It could not award an
accounting of profits because "The People's Purple" was a progressive
competitor that did not make any profit. And it could not award damages
because the court ruled that there was no evidence of actual confusion.
This hypothetical shows the danger of preventing a plaintiff from recovering
damages unless it shows actual confusion. As described in Part III.A, each circuit
uses actual confusion as one factor among many in its likelihood-of-confusion
test, but no circuit requires actual confusion to find infringement. 38 This is the
correct result because as this hypothetical shows, a plaintiff can be injured if a
mark is likely to confuse consumers, even if there is no actual confusion. But for
tihose courts that go furtier and elevate actual Confusion to a requirement for
awarding damages, worthy plaintiffs are denied recovery. Under the
Infringement-Plus-Equity Model, however, a court could award damages in such
circumstances, including compensation for diminished goodwill, lost sales, and
corrective advertising.
HYPOTHETICAL No. 3: THE INNOCENT, YET FREE-RIDING INFRINGER
A small group of movie buffs adopted the mark "Netfdlms" for their movie-
distribution website of hard-to-find movies. These movie buffs knew about
movies, but not about business, and they had no knowledge of the Neflix® mark.
"Netfilms" sold their movies one-by-one for 99¢ apiece, which is a different,
13 See KANE, supra note 20, § 12:1.3 (stating the general rule that "a parody trademark, no matter
how funny, may still be enjoined if it is likely to cause confusion with plaintiff's mark"); see also
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 775 F.2d 247,249 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding the district court's
preliminary injunction finding that "Mutant of Omaha" was likely to cause confusion with "Mutual
of Omaha" because "a validly established trademark may be protected from ridicule which rises to
the level of infringement of the mark").
13s See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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THE INFRINGEMENT-PLUS-EQUITY MODEL
lower pricing model than Netflix's monthly subscription service. At least in part
because of its similar name, "Netfilms" was able to attract many visitors who were
searching for the popular Netflix website. And because of its price, "Netfilms"
quickly developed a vast, loyal customer base and began earning substantial
profits. Netflix sued.
While the court found likelihood of confusion and issued an injunction forcing
"Netfilms" to change its name, it denied Netflix's request for monetary relief.
The court denied an accounting of profits because the court found that the movie
fans adopted "Netfilms" without any willfulness. The court also denied an award
of damages, reasoning that there was no causation because "Netfdlms" focused
on hard-to-find movies at a low individual price point while Netflix offers more
mainstream movies on a subscription plan. Thus, the only relief available was an
injunction. But an injunction does not help Netflix because "Netfilms" already
had a loyal customer base that would easily and eagerly find its new name and
website. It does not matter for purposes of the current model that "Netfilms"
acquired this customer base during infringement, or that it was able to keep this
base after infringement. The current model is too limited to consider such
situations. In the end, "Netfdlms" grew by free-riding on Netflix's trademark and
extensive goodwill, but the courts' requirements of actual confusion and
willfulness denied Netflix's recovery. 139 The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model, in
contrast, would take an expansive view of all of the circumstances, and reason
that while there was no willfulness, "Netfilms" profited because of its similar
mark and should be required to forego those profits.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current model for awarding monetary relief in trademark infringement
cases, at least in several circuits, requires the plaintiff to prove actual confusion
or willfulness or both. This model is broken. It contravenes the text and history
of the Lanham Act, it fails to achieve its own objectives, and it causes a host of
jurisprudential problems. If the point of the current model was to create a formal
139 This example was based in part on one provided by Corgill, supra note 27, at 1949-51. Mr.
Corgill argued that this was an unfair result because even though there were no recoverable profits,
there was still unjust enrichment that demanded compensation. See also Synergistic Int'l, LLC v.
Korman, No. 2:05CV49, 2007 WL 517677, at *11 (E.D. Va. Feb. 8,2007) (finding the following fact
to have "the most impact" in deciding whether to award profits: "[p]laintiff so competes after
having been found to have built her business while improperly using Plaintiffs mark and
impermissibly similar marks, thus Plaintiff enters the market competing with a business built while
violating its rights and is farther deprived of its right to build its business anew through the initial
use of its protected mark"). Corgill proceeded to provide a persuasive argument about the several
ways in which an infringer can benefit from infringement without becoming profitable. Id.
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and simple regime, the current model has done a rather poor job. Nor is the
current model, despite its complexity, sufficiently versatile to address the diverse
facts that give rise to trademark infringement. The law in place now, therefore,
provides neither the determinateness one would expect from a formal system, nor
the versatility that modern trademark litigation demands. A disappointing hybrid
of law and equity, the current regime reflects the virtues of neither.
This Article proposes that courts abolish the current model in favor of the
Infringement-Plus-Equity Model. The Infringement-Plus-Equity Model adheres
closely to the text of the Lanham Act by permitting the plaintiff to argue, and the
court to consider, all of the equitable reasons that the plaintiff is entitled to
monetary relief. The chief virtue of the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model is its
flexibility. While the current model rigidly requires either actual confusion or
willfulness, the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model considers these as two factors
among many that, depending on the equitable circumstances of the case, favor or
disfavor monetary relief. In the end, the Infringement-Plus-Equity Model still
requires the plaintiff to prove that it is entitled to monetary relief, but the plaintiff
will no longer be unnecessarily constrained in what arguments it can advance.
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